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Abstract 
In this paper I will present an analysis of the impact that the notion of “bounded 
rationality”, introduced by Herbert Simon in his book Administrative Behavior, 
produced in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). In particular, by focusing on 
the field of Automated Decision Making (ADM), I will show how the 
introduction of the cognitive dimension into the study of choice of a rational 
(natural) agent, indirectly determined - in the AI field - the development of a line 
of research aiming at the realisation of artificial systems whose decisions are 
based on the adoption of powerful shortcut strategies (known as heuristics) based 
on “satisficing”- i.e. non optimal - solutions to problem solving. I will show how 
the “heuristic approach” to problem solving allowed, in AI, to face problems of 
combinatorial complexity in real-life situations and still represents an important 
strategy for the design and implementation of intelligent systems. 
Keywords: Bounded rationality, Heuristics, Decision-making, Commonsense 
reasoning, Artificial Intelligence 
1. Introduction 
The notion of bounded rationality was introduced by Herbert Simon
1
 in his 
book Administrative Behavior as a constitutive element of a plausible model 
                                                 
1
 Herbert Simon was one of the founding fathers of the AI and, along with people like 
Marvin Minsky, John McCarthy, Allen Newell, Nathaniel Rochester and many others, was 
one of the participants to the Darmouth Workshop providing the foundation of the 
  
 
 
 
 
2 ANTONIO LIETO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of human problem solving and decision making. This notion proposed, for 
the first time, a radically different and alternative view with respect to the 
idealised model of “homo oeconomicus” which was dominant, in that times, 
within the classical economic theory of decision making. Roughly speaking, 
the notion of bounded rationality refers to the cognitive limits (e.g. 
perceptual, of memory, reasoning, processing etc.) that human decision 
makers have, and have to face, when they have to make decisions in real life 
situations. Such limits lead humans to adopt “bounded”, i.e. non optimal 
(but “satisficing”), solution strategies that can be cognitively dealt with. As 
mentioned, this approach diverged from the classical theory of decision 
making according to which humans were seen as perfectly rational decision 
makers, able to make optimal decisions via a maximisation of their expected 
utility in any give situation
2
. As I will argue in this paper, the introduction 
of this notion influenced not only economic model of decision making but 
also the field of the early Artificial Intelligence, an area in which Simon was 
directly involved since its foundations.   
In the following, I will present two case studies in the field of 
automated reasoning with the intent of showing, at least in part, the impact 
that such notion had in this field of AI research. Before presenting these 
particular case studies, however, I will propose a brief historical digression 
concerning the influence that such idea had in the development of the early 
AI systems and formalisms.  
2. The Early days of AI 
In the early days of Artificial Intelligence, whose date of birth is historically 
associated to the summer of 1956, during the so called “Dartmouth 
                                                                                                                            
discipline. Simon was trained as a psychologist and awarded by the Nobel Prize in 
Economy for his studies on the “bounded rationality” in human decision making. He was 
one of the main scholars pointing out, in both cognitive psychology and AI, the role played 
by the heuristics as decisional shortcuts to solve complex problems (for this line of research 
he was also awarded, with Allen Newell, by the Turing Award in 1975; see Newell & 
Simon, 1976). On the particular meanings attributed to the term “heuristics” in the AI 
research, we remind the reader to the following sections.  
2
 The theory of the expected utility was introduced in game theory by Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (see Morgenstern and Von Neumann, 1953). In general, in this setting, 
preference relations are usually modelled by means of utility functions defined on a set of 
alternatives with values in a suitable set of numbers (usually, real numbers). The decision 
model of this theory assumes an optimal (i.e. unbounded) decision maker able to calculate 
and chose, in each phase of problem solving, the move that maximise the utility function.    
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Workshop”3, the research on intelligent machines was strongly and 
explicitly inspired by that one coming from the experimental research in 
Psychology
4
. A manifestation of this connection is represented by the early 
AI systems/frameworks in AI developed until the ‘80s of the last century: 
most of the them were developed according to a “cognitively-oriented” 
inspiration. In the following we just mention few examples of such systems. 
and formalisms. 
3. From the General Problem Solver to the Cognitive Architectures 
One of the first AI systems, developed from the end of the ‘50s of the last 
century, is represented by the pioneering work of Herbert Simon, John 
Clifford Shaw and Allen Newell on the General Problem Solver (GPS): a 
system able to demonstrate simple logic theorems whose decision strategies 
were explicitly inspired by human verbal protocols
5
. The underlying idea of 
this approach was that, the computer system had to approximate the 
decision operations described by the humans in their verbal descriptions as 
closely as possible. In this way, when the program ran on the computer, it 
would have been possible to identify its problems, compare them with the 
description of the human verbalisation and modify them to improve its 
performance. In particular, the GPS system was able to implement a key 
mechanism in human problem solving: the so called means-ends analysis 
(or M-E heuristic). In M-E analysis the problem solver compares the 
current situation with a goal situation; computes the difference between the 
two states; finds in memory an operator that experience has taught reduces 
differences of this kind; and applies the operator to change the current 
situation. Repeating this process, the goal may gradually be attained via a 
reduction of the search space(although, computationally, there are generally 
                                                 
3
 This event was formally organised by John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Nathaniel 
Rochester and Claude Shannon. The workshop run for different weeks and saw the 
participation of many researchers interested in this emerging discipline. An archive of the 
Darthmouth workshop, based on the notes of Ray Solomonoff (one the participant), is 
available on line at the following url: http://raysolomonoff.com/dartmouth/. 
4
 It must be noted that, at those times, there was not a “Cognitive Science” or a “Cognitive 
Psychology” field. However, all the disciplines (philosophy, psychology, computer science, 
anthropology, linguistics and neurophysiology) and the cultural elements that would have 
been later formed the interdisciplinary field of “Cognitive Science” were already present.    
5
 Newell et al. (1959). This technique in also known as “thinking aloud" protocol in the 
psychological literature and consists in recording the verbal explanations provided by the 
people while executing a given laboratory task. 
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no guarantees that the process will succeed). This kind of heuristic was used 
to solve, also in the decades to come, problems in a number of AI domains 
(from planning to diagnostics). In order to be executed, in fact, it “only” 
requireda domain representation of the problem to solve (a problem space), 
operators to move through the space, and information about which operators 
were relevant for reducing which differences
6
.  
In the decade following the development of the GPS, i.e. in the ‘60s, 
another influential contribution in AI of cognitive inspiration was due to 
Ross Quillian (a Ph.D. student of Herbert Simon at the Carnegie Institute of 
Technology, now Carnegie Mellon University) that invented the Semantic 
Networks, a psychologically plausible model of human semantic memory 
implemented in a computer system. The idea of Quillian was that human 
memory was associative in nature and that concepts were represented as sort 
of nodes in graphs and activated through a mechanism of “spreading 
activation”, allowing to propagate information through the network to 
determine relationships between objects. In this setting, the highest was the 
activation of a node in the network, the more contextually relevant that 
node/concept was assumed to be for the task in focus (e.g. retrieval, 
reasoning, recall, planning etc.). Also in this case, the cognitive limit 
concerning the storage  capacity of our memory triggered the inquiry about 
the underlying mechanisms governing our memory system. As a 
consequence, this led to the development of a cognitively inspired model of 
knowledge representation and retrieval. Evolution of the semantic networks 
are still nowadays widely used in the subfield of AI known as Knowledge 
Representation (and in particular in systems known as computational 
ontologies, that will be better introduced later in the paper).   
In the ‘70s, another well know example of cognitively-inspired AI 
framework was represented by the introduction of the Frames operated by 
Marvin Minsky
7
. This framework was used for representing, in artificial 
systems, commonsense knowledge (including default knowledge) about the 
external world. This type of knowledge organization proposed in the Frames 
enabled the first AI systems to extend their automated reasoning abilities 
from the classical deduction to more complicated forms of commonsense 
                                                 
6
 The ingredients required for the execution of this kind of heuristic strategy - essentially 
based on a “search space” approach to problem solving - explicitly supported the so called 
“symbolic approach” to the study, the analysis, the execution and the replication of 
intelligent behaviour. 
7
 Minsky (1975). 
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and defeasible reasoning
8
. In this case, the idea of the Frames was directly 
inspired by the work of the psychologist Eleanor Rosh about the 
organization of conceptual information in humans known as prototype 
theory
9
.  
In the ‘80s, finally, other notable examples of the so called “cognitivist” 
tradition in Artificial Intelligence were represented by: i) the invention of 
the notion of Script (Shank and Abelson) as a data structure for representing 
knowledge of common sequences of events (e.g. the sequence of events 
used to go out for a dinner) and used in natural language processing systems 
as way to enable intelligent to answer questions about simple stories
10
 or by 
ii) the work operated by Allen Newell and colleagues at Carnegie Mellon 
University on the first cognitive architecture for general intelligence: 
SOAR
11
.  
This list of examples is, of course, not exhaustive but it can be useful to 
indicate the main assumptions made by the early AI researchers and 
synthesized by Pat Langley
12
 in this way: “(early) AI aimed at 
understanding andreproducing in computational systems the full range of 
intelligent behavior observed by humans”13. The underlying assumption of 
that period was that, in order to reach this broad goal, the only way to 
proceed in the analysis of intelligent systems (natural and artificial) was that 
                                                 
8
 All the forms of commonsense reasoning can be seen as abounded rationality 
phenomenon since they represent a plethora of shortcuts allowing us to make decisions in 
an environment with incomplete and uncertain information. 
9
 According to the Rosh’s theory, concepts, the building block of our thoughts, are 
organised in our mind in terms of prototypes (i.e. in terms of representative elements of the 
category) and such organization explain many types of so called typicality effects (i.e. of 
commonsense inferences) that we naturally perform in our everyday reasoning. 
10
 A classical example to explain the notion of “Script” is the so called “restaurant 
situation”. Let us consider to model a situation of an agent going out to a restaurant for 
dinner. A script representing the restaurant situation is a data structure that would record the 
typical events associated to this scenario: e.g. entering in the restaurant, asking for a table, 
sitting down, consulting a menu, eating the food, pay the check etc. This kind of  
representational structure enabled early AI system to answer questions to simple stories. 
For a story like this, for example: “Mary went to a restaurant, ordered a salmon. When she 
was paying she noticed that she was late for the next appointment”, computerised systems 
were able to answer to a question like: “Did Mary eat dinner last night?” in a positive way 
(as we do). It is worth-noticing that this information is not explicitly provided in the story. 
Answering to these types of questions was possible through the use of a script of the 
restaurant situation. 
11
 Laird et al. (1987). On the role of the Cognitive architectures for general intelligent 
systems we remind to (Lieto et al., 2018). 
12
 Langley (2012). 
13
 Ibid. 
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one of discovering the heuristic strategies adopted by humans (or other 
animals) that could have been later operationalised and replicated in 
artificial systems. 
It is worth-noticing, however, that this kind of approach to the “study of 
the artificial” did not came out ex-abrupto. It borrowed its original 
inspiration –from a historical perspective–from the methodological 
apparatus developed by the scholars in Cybernetics
14
.  
The origins of cybernetics are usually traced back to the middle of the 
1940s, with the release of the 1948 book of Norbert Wiener entitled 
Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine. One of underlying idea of cybernetics was that one of building 
mechanical models to simulate the adaptive behavior of natural systems. As 
indicated in Cordeschi
15
: “the fundamental insight of cybernetics was in the 
proposal of a unified study of organisms and machines”. In this perspective, 
the computational simulation of biological processes was assumed to play a 
central epistemological role in the development and refinement of theories 
about the elements characterizing the nature of intelligent behaviour in 
natural and artificial systems. Such simulative approach, as mentioned, was 
inherited by the early AI research and the adoption of such perspective was 
crucial for the development of both intelligent solutions inspired by human 
processes and heuristics
16
 and for the realisation of computational models of 
cognition realized with the aim of providing a deeper understanding of 
human thinking, as originally suggested in the manifesto of the Information 
Processing Psychology (IPP)
17
. These two sides of the cognitivist tradition 
are nowadays still alive. They correspond, roughly, to the research areas of 
Cognitive Systems or cognitively-inspired AI (Cognitive-AI) and to that one 
of cognitive modelling (or Computational Cognitive Science) respectively.  
4. Heuristics and AI Eras  
The notion of heuristics deserves, in this historical digression, and in the 
light of the purposes of this paper, a special attention. It was used, in fact, 
with two different meanings since the times of the first AI researches. In its 
first sense, the term referred to the most detailed simulation possible of 
human cognitive processes, and it characterized the above mentioned 
                                                 
14
 Cordeschi (1991). 
15
 Cordeschi (2002). 
16
 Newell & Simon (1976), Gigerenzer & Todd (1999). 
17
 Newell & Simon (1972). 
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Information Processing Psychology (IPP) introduced by Newell and Simon. 
In this view, a computer program was considered as a model providing a 
test of the hypothesis that the mind is an information-processing system. 
More precisely, “the program was considered to be a highly specific 
behavioral theory, concerning the behavior of an individual human problem-
solver: a microtheory”18.  
In another sense, the term referred to the possibility of obtaining the 
most efficient (and efficacious) performance possible from computer 
programs, by allowing also for typically non-human procedures, such as 
those where the computer can excel. Before the introduction of the term 
“heuristics” in AI, operated by Newell, Shaw and Simon, there were already 
available algorithmic procedures which might have been defined as heuristic 
in the second of these senses had already been tried out experimentally. The 
first among them were the procedures that allowed the program developed 
by Arthur Samuelto play chess despite the combinatory explosion of 
moves
19
. 
The fact that these two tendencies, reflected in this double meaning of 
the term “heuristics”, coexisted in AI was immediately clear. As reported in 
Cordeschi (2002: 190), in 1961, while discussing a presentation of GPS 
given by Simon during a seminar at MIT, Minsky drew a distinction in AI 
research between those who were willing to use "non-human techniques" in 
constructing intelligent programs and those, like the Carnegie-Mellon 
group, who were interested in simulating human cognitive processes
20
. This 
distinction is crucial, since outlines the raise of different research agendas 
already in those years. This divergence started to be very significant in the 
mid’80s of the last century. After decades of pioneering collaborations, in 
fact, several sub-fields, each with its own goals, methods and evaluation 
criteria were produced. On the one hand this fragmentation led AI to reach 
remarkable results in a variety of narrow fields by focussing on quantitative 
results and metrics of performance, and on a machine-oriented approach to 
                                                 
18
 Cordeschi (2002: 182). In this view, the general theory of human information-processing 
was assumed to be derivable from a body of qualitative generalizations coming from the 
study of individual simulative programs, or microtheories. 
19
 Samuel (1959). 
20
 As reported in Cordeschi (2002), Minsky emphasized that these two tendencies were 
distinguished “in methods and goals” from a third tendency, that which “has a 
physiological orientation and alleges to be based on an imitation of the brain,” i.e. neural 
net and self-organizing system approaches. This tendency would have lead to the 
development of the neural and brain inspired methods which are the basis of the so-called 
“connectionist agenda” (nowadays wide-spreading due to the recent success of deep 
learning).  
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the intelligent behaviour (i.e., without taking into account human-inspired 
heuristics). On the other hand, however, it significantly inhibited the cross-
field collaborations and the research efforts targeted at investigating a more 
general picture of what natural and artificial intelligence is, and how 
intelligent artifacts can be designed by taking into account the insights 
coming from human cognition.   
In the last few years, however, the cognitive approach to AI gained a 
renewed consideration, both from academia and industry, in wide research 
areas such as Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Robotics, Machine 
Learning, Bio-Inspired Cognitive Computing, Computational Creativity and 
further research fields that aspire to Human Level Intelligence. Nowadays, 
in fact, artificial systems endowed with human-like and human-level 
intelligence
21
 are still far from being achieved and, as I will try to show in 
the following section, the adoption of cognitively-inspired heuristics (all 
directly based on bounded rationality assumption) seems to be a suitable 
way to handle problems that non-human oriented algorithmic processes are 
not able to deal with.  
In the next section, I will decline this argument by presenting two case 
studies in the field of knowledge representation and automated reasoning.  
5. Cognitive heuristics in modern AI: two case studies in Automatic 
Reasoning 
The representation of conceptual information, and the corresponding 
reasoning mechanisms that can be built on such representations, is a crucial 
problem to deal with in  the subfield of AI known as Knowledge 
Representation (KR). In this field, one of the most widespread system 
currently used are the so called computational ontologies, defined as “an 
engineering artifact, constituted by a specific vocabulary used to describe a 
certain reality, plus a set of explicit assumptions regarding the intended 
meaning of the vocabulary words”22. 
The main building blocks of ontological models are, therefore, concepts 
(or classes), roles (or properties), and individuals describing a given domain. 
In other words: ontologies provide an explicit and axiomized reference 
domain model. Such model is used to interpret and organise the information 
and to perform simple forms of automatic reasoning. 
                                                 
21
 McCarthy (2007). 
22
 Guarino (1998). 
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Ontological models are built on by using a class of logical formalisms 
that are known as Description Logics (DLs)
23
. Technically, DLs are 
decidable subsets of first-order logic in which a standard Tarskian semantics 
is directly associated to the syntax  of the language. The decidability is 
usually obtained by restricting the set of variables and operators that are 
allowed inside formulae. In DL systems, inferential knowledge is formally 
expressed by means of “terminological axioms”, which are simply 
notational variants of classical meaning postulates - i.e. universally 
quantified (bi)conditional statements that constrain the extensions of the 
constant that appear in the antecedent (e.g. see the figure below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of terminological axioms in Description Logics 
 
The meaning postulates approach assumed in the tarskian semantics of 
Description Logics, however, is not immune from problems. For instance, it 
is known that meaning postulates can formally express only rigid relations 
between concepts, i.e. relations that do not allow for exceptions (e.g. if x is a 
bachelor, than x is not married). As a consequence, standard DL system and 
ontologies are not capable to model prototypical knowledge and defeasible 
inference
24
, which - on the other hand - represents the way in which the 
humans encode and reason on conceptual information. 
In the field of logic-oriented KR, various non-monotonic extensions of 
DL formalisms have been designed to deal with some aspects of typicality 
and automated commonsense reasoning
25
. A proposed solution has been that 
one of integrating a set of meaning postulates with a non-monotonic logic 
                                                 
23
 Badeer et al. (2010). 
24
 Lieto (2012). 
25
 E.g. Bonatti et al. (2006), Lukasiewicz & Straccia (2008), Giordano et al. (2013). 
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like Default Logics
26
. This is the solution adopted by Baader & Hollunder 
(1995); the same authors, however, point out both the computational 
difficulties of this integration. Current literature also offers several attempts 
to formulate DLs extensions based on fuzzy logic
27
 and some 
“probabilistic” versions of DL languages have been also proposed, which 
try to combine the DL language with probabilistic theories based on 
Bayesian formalisms
28
. Despite these computational advancements, 
however, the use of non-monotonic and, in general, non-classical logics in 
the field is not universally accepted due to the high computational 
complexity, and therefore their practical intractability, intrinsic to such 
formalisms. In other words: the use of non-human inspired procedures does 
not seem to provide any practical advantage for modelling the problem of 
commonsense reasoning related to typicality.  
An alternative move was proposed by adopting a cognitively-inspired 
system explicitly implementing a plethora of cognitive assumptions and 
heuristics for commonsense reasoning. This has recently led to the 
development of a system called DUAL-PECCS (Dual Prototype and 
Exemplars Based Conceptual Categorization System)
29
, able to combine on 
a large scale, both commonsense representation and reasoning with standard 
ontological DL-based semantics. The main merit of such proposal lies in the 
adoption of the representational component of Conceptual Spaces (a 
geometric and cognitively inspired framework for concept representation 
and formation, see Gärdenfors, 2000) that has been successfully integrated 
with ontological formalisms
30
. 
DUAL PECCS, explicitly implement the following cognitive 
assumptions: i) the fact that conceptual representations are heterogeneous 
co-referring representational structures demanded to different computational 
frameworks and ii) the fact that the different reasoning strategies executed 
on such representations are harmonised according to the dual process theory 
or reasoning and rationality
31
. 
                                                 
26
 Reiter (1980). 
27
 E.g., Caligari et al. (2007). 
28
 Ding et al (2006). 
29
 Lieto et al. (2015), Lieto et al. (2017). 
30
 The solution adopted in DUAL-PECCS is one of the three proposals currently suggested 
to overcome the current problems affecting the knowledge level of cognitive artificial 
systems. Alternative proposals are represented by the Semantic Pointers (Eliasmith et al., 
2012) and by the neuro-symbolic approaches à la ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2004). A 
detailed comparative analysis among the different approaches is in Lieto et al. (2018b).  
31
 For the details see Lieto (2014) and Lieto (2019). 
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The heterogeneous conceptual architecture of DUAL PECCS currently 
includes “typical” commonsense representations (i.e. prototypes and 
exemplars) and classical “rigid” representations allowed by the Description 
Logics Semantics. All these different bodies of knowledge point to the same 
conceptual entity
32
. An example of the heterogeneous conceptual 
architecture of DUAL PECCS is provided in the figure 2 below. Such figure 
shows how it is represented the concept DOG. In this case, the prototypical 
representation grasps information such as that dogs are usually 
conceptualized as domestic animals, with typically four legs, a tail etc.; the 
exemplar-based representations grasp information on individuals. For 
example, it is represented the individual of Lessie, which is a particular 
exemplar of dog with white and brown fur and with a less domestic attitude 
w.r.t. the prototypical dog (e.g. its typical location is lawn). 
 
Figure 2. An example of the hybrid conceptual architecture in DUAL PECCS.  
 
Within the system, both these two types of typicality based 
representations are represented by using the framework of the conceptual 
spaces proposed by Gärdenfors
33
. Such framework allows to adopt standard 
                                                 
32
 The procedures for the automatic anchoring for these different types of representations 
are described in Lieto et al. (2016). 
33
 Gärdenfors (2000). 
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similarity metrics to determine the distance between instances and concepts 
within the space. The representation of classical information (e.g. the fact 
that Dog ⊑Animal , that is to say that “Dogs are also Animals”) is, on the 
other hand, demanded to standard ontological formalisms. 
From a reasoning perspective, in DUAL-PECCS, different kinds of 
reasoning strategies are associated to these different bodies of knowledge. In 
particular, the system combines non-monotonic commonsense reasoning 
(executed on conceptual spaces representations and based on measures of 
“semantic similarity”) and standard monotonic categorization procedures 
(executed on the classical, ontological, body of knowledge). These different 
types of reasoning are harmonized according to the theoretical tenets 
coming from the dual process theories of reasoning and rationality 
according to which fast - non monotonic - reasoning is executed first and 
more logical - deliberative - reasoning is executed later. 
Given this explicit cognitive assumptions, DUAL PECCS has been 
tested in conceptual categorisation of commonsense linguistic descriptions 
similar to riddles (i.e. of the form “which is the big feline with yellow fur 
and black stripes?” etc.).  
This kind of task is a very difficult one from an AI perspective since, in 
commonsense reasoning, also state-of-the-art AI systems like IBM Watson 
obtain very poor results
34
. On the other hand, the results obtained by DUAL 
PECCS are promising both when compared with human performances (with 
an overlapping of the 89% of the responses, see Lieto et al., 2017 for the 
results in details) and when compared to other artificial systems like 
Google, Bing or Wolphram Alpha
35
. An additional advantage of the 
proposed approach lies in the fact that it limits the computational 
complexity of the commonsense reasoning strategy to linear time (i.e. O(n)), 
since the mechanism of typicality based categorisation technically 
corresponds to measuring the semantic relatedness of a query vector - in 
which the linguistic input is transformed - with respect to a vectorial 
knowledge-base of conceptual spaces (and this process can be solved in 
linear time with respect to the size of the knowledge base).  
As a consequence, this case study seems to suggest that, also in the 
modern AI, the adoption of bounded rationality heuristics in the design and 
implementation of intelligent systems can represent an important aspect to 
consider in order to progress forward more human-like and human-level AI 
systems. 
                                                 
34
 See Davis & Marcus (2015). 
35
 See Lieto et al. (2017b) for a detailed analysis of the obtained results. 
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As a second case study, which also related to the above mentioned 
problem of commonsense representation and reasoning in AI systems, let us 
consider the problem of obtaining, via compositionality heuristics, a 
commonsense compound concept obtained by combining the typical 
knowledge of the composing concepts.  
Dealing with such ability requires, from an AI perspective, the 
harmonization of two conflicting requirements that are hardly 
accommodated in symbolic systems: the need of a syntactic 
compositionality (typical of logical systems) and that one concerning the 
exhibition of typicality effects
36
. According to a well-known argument
37
, in 
fact, prototypical concepts are not compositional. The argument runs as 
follows: consider a concept like PET FISH. It results from the composition 
of the concept pet and of the concept fish. However, the prototype of pet 
fish cannot result from the composition of the prototypes of a pet and a fish: 
e.g. a typical pet is furry and warm, a typical fish is grayish, but a typical pet 
fish is neither furry and warm nor grayish (typically, it is red).  
Recently, a logical framework able to account for this type of human-
like concept combination has been proposed in the field of nonmonotonic 
Description Logics of typicality: T
CL
 (Typicality-based Compositional 
Logic, for the details see Lieto & Pozzato, 2018).  
This logic combines three main ingredients. The first one relies on the 
DL of typicality ALC + TR introduced in Giordano et al. (2015).  In this 
logic, “typical” properties can be directly specified by means of a 
“typicality” operator T enriching the underlying DL, and a knowledge base 
(KB) can contain inclusions able to represent that “typical Cs are also Ds”. 
In  ALC + TR one can consistently express exceptions and reason about 
defeasible inheritance as well.  
A second ingredient is represented by a distributed semantics similar to 
the one of probabilistic DLs known as DISPONTE
38
, allowing to label 
ontological axioms with degrees representing probabilities, but restricted to 
typicality inclusions. The basic idea is to label inclusions of the type 
“typical Cs are also Ds” with a real number between 0.5 and 1, representing 
its probability, assuming that each axiom is independent from each others 
(the actual probabilistic values are assumed to come from an application 
domain). The resulting knowledge base defines a probability distribution 
over scenarios. 
                                                 
36
 See Lieto (2012) and the references in Lieto et al. (2018) for a contextualized overview 
of such a problem. 
37
 Osherson & Smith (1981). 
38
 Riguzzi et al. (2015). 
  
 
 
 
 
14 ANTONIO LIETO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third element of the proposed formalization is represented by the 
adoption of an heuristics method inspired by cognitive semantics
39
 called 
HEAD-MODIFIER heuristics. Such heuristics allows to characterise a 
dominance effect between the concepts to be combined. In particular, for 
every combination, it allows to distinguish a HEAD, representing the 
stronger element of the combination, and  one  (or more) MODIFIERs. The 
basic idea is: given a KB and two concepts CH (HEAD) and CM 
(MODIFIER) occurring in it, only some scenarios are considered in order to 
define a revised knowledge base, enriched by typical properties of the 
combined concept.  
The selection criteria of such scenario is obtained as follows: given a 
KB K and given two concepts CH and CM occurring in K, T
CL 
allows 
defining the compound concept C as the combination of the HEAD (CH) 
and the MODIFIER (CM), where C ⊑ CH ⊓ CM.  
The typical properties of the form T(C) ⊑  D to ascribe to the concept C 
are obtained in the set of scenarios, obtained by applying the DISPONTE 
semantics, that: i) are consistent with respect to K; ii) are not trivial (i.e. 
those with the highest probability, in the sense that the scenarios considering 
all properties that can be consistently ascribed to C, or all the properties of 
the HEAD that can be consistently ascribed to C are discarded); iii) are 
those giving preference to the typical properties of the HEAD CH (with 
respect to those of the MODIFIER CM) with the highest probability.  
An additional element in T
CL
, inherited from the representational 
assumptions considered in DUAL PECCS, is that a KB in such a formalism 
combines both “rigid” and “typical” knowledge. 
In this way, as shown in detail in Lieto & Pozzato (2018), it is possible 
to model phenomena like the above described PET FISH composition. In 
particular, this problem is modelled as follows: let K be a Knowledge base 
containing the rigid inclusion (*) Fish ⊑∀ livesIn.Water and the following 
typical inclusions equipped with probabilities: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 See Hampton (1987) for a review. 
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In this case, by applying the DISPONTE semantics, we have 2
7
 = 128 
different scenarios. In T
CL
, inconsistent scenarios are discarded along with 
those that are trivial and privilege the MODIFIER with respect to the 
HEAD. It turns out that the logic T
CL
 is able to select the scenario with the 
following typical properties (which are those required for handling the PET 
FISH prototypical composition): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the composed concept PET FISH also inherits the 
rigid inclusion ⊑∀ livesIn.Water from (*). 
In addition, in such a logical framework, adding a new inclusion T 
(PET ⊓ FISH) ⊑  Red, would not be problematic (i.e. this logic tackles the 
phenomenon of prototypical attributes emergence). The proposed logic has 
been recently applied to a number of cognitive phenomena including: 
conjunction fallacy, metaphors generation, and iterative conceptual 
combination
40
.  
An important element emerging from this particular application, and 
relevant with respect to the overall overview proposed in this paper, lies in 
the fact that it would have been not possible to model all such phenomena 
without considering all the 3 ingredients of such logic (including the 
HEAD-MODIFIER heuristics). In other words, all such elements are 
individually necessary but only jointly sufficient to tackle a complex 
problem like the one described above. This is a symptom of the fact that, the 
application (and integration) of cognitive heuristics in artificial systems and 
formalisms, can still play an important role in AI. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have argued that the notion of bounded rationality heuristics 
has influenced, directly or indirectly, the theoretical and applied research in 
the field of Artificial Intelligence. I have provided a brief historical 
contextualization to the rise, the fall and the recent renewed interest in the 
design approach based on cognitive heuristics and historically ascribable to 
                                                 
40
 Lieto & Pozzato (2019). 
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the cognitivist tradition in AI. Finally I have provided two simple case 
studies in the field of ADM by showing that the role that cognitive 
heuristics can play in the so-called “science of the artificial”41 is still a 
relevant one in the years to come. In particular, a cognitive-based approach 
to development of AI systems seems to be still relevant in all those tasks 
that are easily solvable for humans but very hard to solve for machines (and 
the problem of commonsense reasoning is paradigmatic in this perspective). 
Other relevant research areas that may benefit from this kind of approach 
concern, for example, the problems of: analogical reasoning; learning from 
few examples (differently from what current deep learning techniques do); 
transfer learning; multimodal perception and attentive mechanisms; 
computational creativity and knowledge invention; narrative and story 
understanding; integration of mechanisms involving planning, acting, 
monitoring and goal reasoning; emotion modelling and the so called area of 
explainable AI or XAI (a novel name for a very old problem consisting in 
truing to provide human-understandable explanations of algorithmic 
decisions). As this illustrative lists shows, such problems involve both low-
level (e.g. perceptual) and high level (e.g. reasoning) cognitive capacities 
(usually modelled in AI by adopting connectionist and symbolic approaches 
respectively). That is to say that the cognitive approach is agnostic with 
respect to the classes of formalisms applied to model a given phenomenon 
and can be applied to both the symbolic and the connectionist research 
agendas, as the recent history of Cognitive Science has successfully showed 
in the last 30 years. 
Acknowledgements 
The content of this paper has benefited from many discussions with Roberto 
Cordeschi and Marcello Frixione. Of course eventual errors can be ascribed 
only to myself. I am also indebted to the feedback and comments received 
by Amedeo Cesta, Antonio Chella, Fabio Paglieri, Oliviero Stock and 
Giuseppe Trautteur during the panel  
“Can AI and Cognitive Science still live together happily ever after?”  
(link: http://aiia2017.di.uniba.it/index.php/joint-panel-aiia-and-aisc/)  
organised at the international conference AI*IA 2017 in Bari. The work on 
DUAL PECCS and on the TCL logic has been carried out with Daniele 
Radicioni, Valentina Rho and Gian Luca Pozzato. 
                                                 
41
 Simon (1981). 
  
 
 
 
 
Bounded Rationality and Heuristics in Humans and in Artificial Cognitive Systems 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Anderson, J. R., Bothell, D., Byrne, M. D., Douglass, S., Lebiere, C., & Qin, 
Y. (2004), “An Integrated Theory of the Mind”, in Psychological 
review, 111(4), 1036. 
Baader, F., Calvanese, D., McGuinness, D., Nardi, D., & Patel-Schneider, P. 
(2010), The Description Logic Handbook: Theory, Implementations and 
Applications , 2nd  edition, Cambridge, University Press. 
Baader, F., & Hollunder, B. (1995), “Embedding Defaults into 
Terminological Knowledge Representation Formalisms”, in J. Autom. 
Reasoning  14, 1: 149–180. 
Bonatti, P. A., Lutz C., & Wolter, F. (2006), “Description Logics with 
Circumscription”, in Proceedings of KR, pp. 400–410. 
Calegari, S., & Ciucci, D. (2007), “Fuzzy Ontology, Fuzzy Description 
Logics and Fuzzy-OWL”, in Proc. WILF 2007 , LNCS, volume 4578. 
Cordeschi, R. (1991), “The Discovery of the Artificial. Some 
Protocybernetic Developments”, in 1930–1940. AI & society, 5  , 218–
238. 
Cordeschi, R. (2002), The Discovery of the Artificial: Behavior, Mind and 
Machines Before and Beyond Cybernetics, Springer Science & 
Business Media, Volume 28. 
Davis E., & Marcus, G. (2015), “Commonsense Reasoning and 
Commonsense Knowledge in Artificial Intelligence”, in 
Communications of the ACM, 58(9):92–103, 2015. 
Ding, Z., Peng, Y., & Pan, R. (2006). “Bayes OWL: Uncertainty Modeling 
in Semantic Web Ontologies”, in Soft Computing in Ontologies and 
Semantic Web , Z. Ma (ed.), Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, 
Volume 204, Springer. 
Eliasmith, C., Stewart, T. C., Choo, X., Bekolay, T., De Wolf, T., Tang, Y., 
& Rasmussen, D. (2012), “A Large-scale Model of the Functioning 
Brain”, in Science, 338(6111), 1202-1205. 
  
 
 
 
 
18 ANTONIO LIETO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Frankish, K. (eds.) (2008), In Two Minds: Dual 
Processes and Beyond , Oxford UP, New York, NY.  
Gärdenfors, P. (2000), Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999), Simple Heuristics that Make Us 
Smart, Oxford University Press, USA. 
Giordano, L., Gliozzi, V., Olivetti, N., & Pozzato, G. L. (2013), “A Non-
monotonic Description Logic for Reasoning about Typicality.”, in 
Artificial Intelligence, 195, 165–202. 
Giordano, L., Gliozzi, V., Olivetti, N., & Pozzato, G.L. (2015), “Semantic 
Characterization of Rational Closure: from Propositional Logic to 
Description Logics”, in Artificial Intelligence 226, 1–33. 
Guarino, N. (1998), “Formal Onthology in Information Systems”, in 
Proceedings of the First International Conference (FOIS’98), June 6-8, 
Trento, Italy, Volume 46. IOS Press.  
Hampton, J.A. (1987), “Inheritance of Attributes in Natural Concept 
Conjunctions”, in Memory & Cognition 15(1), 55–71. 
Langley, P. (2012), “The Cognitive Systems Paradigm”, in Advances in 
Cognitive Systems, 1, 3–13. 
Laird, J. E., Newell, A., & Rosenbloom, P. S. (1987), “Soar: An 
Architecture for General Intelligence”, in Artificial Intelligence, 33, 1–
64. 
Lieto, A. (2012), Non Classical Concept Representation and Reasoning in 
Formal Ontologies, PhD thesis, Università degli studi di Salerno. 
Lieto, A. (2014), “A Computational Framework for Concept Representation 
in Cognitive Systems and Architectures: Concepts as Heterogeneous 
Proxytypes”, in Procedia Computer Science, 41, 6–14.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Bounded Rationality and Heuristics in Humans and in Artificial Cognitive Systems 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lieto, A. (2019), “Heterogeneous Proxytypes Extended: Integrating Theory-
like Representations and Mechanisms with Prototypes and Exemplars”, 
in Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures 2018. BICA 2018. 
Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, Volume 848. Springer, 
Cham. 
Lieto, A., Bhatt, M., Oltramari, A., & Vernon, D. (2018), “The Role of 
Cognitive Architectures in General Artificial Intelligence”, in Cognitive 
Systems Research, 48, 1-3. 
Lieto, A., Lebiere, C., & Oltramari, A. (2018b), “The Knowledge Level in 
Cognitive Architectures: Current Limitations and Possible 
Developments”, in Cognitive Systems Research, 48, 39-55. 
Lieto, A., Mensa, E., & Radicioni D.P. (2016), “A Resource-Driven 
Approach for Anchoring Linguistic Resources to Conceptual Spaces”, 
in XVth International Conference of the Italian Association for 
Artificial Intelligence, Genova, Italy, November 29-December 1, 2016, 
volume 10037 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 435–449. 
Springer, 2016. 
Lieto, A., & Pozzato, G. L. (2018), “A Description Logic of Typicality for 
Conceptual Combination”, in Proceedings of the 24th International 
Symposium on Methodologies for Intelligent Systems, ISMIS 2018, 
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Springer. 
Lieto, A., & Pozzato, G. L. (2019), “A Description Logic Framework for 
Commonsense Conceptual Combination Integrating Typicality, 
Probabilities and Cognitive Heuristics”, in arXiv, preprint 
arXiv:1811.02366, to appear in Journal of Experimental & Theoretical 
Artificial Intelligence. 
Lieto, A., Radicioni, D.P., & Rho, V. (2015), “A Common-Sense 
Conceptual Categorization System Integrating Heterogeneous 
Proxytypes and the Dual Process of Reasoning”, in Proceedings of the 
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 
Buenos Aires, 875-881, AAAI Press. 
Lieto, A., Radicioni, D.P., & Rho, V. (2017), “Dual PECCS: a Cognitive 
System for Conceptual Representation and Categorization”, in Journal 
of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 29(2):433-452. 
  
 
 
 
 
20 ANTONIO LIETO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lieto, A., Radicioni, D., Rho, V., & Mensa, E. (2017b), “Towards a 
Unifying Framework for Conceptual Representation and Reasoning in 
Cognitive Systems”, in Intelligenza Artificiale, 11(2), 139-153. 
Lukasiewicz, T., & Straccia, U. (2008), “Managing Uncertainty and 
Vagueness in Description Logics for the Semantic Web”, in Journal of 
Web Semantics 6: 291–308. 
McCarthy, J. (2007), “From Here to Human-level AI”, in Artificial 
Intelligence, 171, 1174–1182. 
Minsky, M. (1975), “A Framework for Representing Knowledge”, in 
Patrick Winston, H. (ed.), The Psychology of Computer Vision , 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Morgenstern, O., & Von Neumann, J. (1953), Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press. 
Newell, A. (1990), Unified Theories of Cognition, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
Newell, A., Shaw, J.C., & Simon, H. A. (1959), “Report on a General 
Problem-solving Program”, in Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Information Processing, pp. 256–264. 
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972), Human Problem Solving, Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Newell A., & Simon, H. A. (1976), “Computer Science as Empirical 
Inquiry: Symbols and Search”, in Communications of the ACM, 
19(3):113–126. 
Osherson, D.N., & Smith, E.E. (1981), “On the Adequacy of Prototype 
Theory as a Theory of Concepts”, in Cognition 9(1) 35–58. 
Quillian, R. (1968), Semantic Memory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Riguzzi, F., Bellodi, E., Lamma, E., & Zese, R. (2015), “Reasoning with 
Probabilistic Ontologies”, in Yang, Q., & Wooldridge, M. (eds.), 
Proceedings of  IJCAI 2015, AAAI Press, 4310–4316. 
  
 
 
 
 
Bounded Rationality and Heuristics in Humans and in Artificial Cognitive Systems 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samuel, A.L. (1959), “Machine Learning”, in The Technology Review, 62 
(1): 42-45. 
Schank, R. C. & Abelson, R. P. (1977), Scripts, Plans, Goals and 
Understanding, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N.J. 
Simon, H. A. (1947), Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making 
Processes in Administrative Organization, New York: Macmillan. 
Simon, H. A. (1981), The Sciences of the Artificial, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 2nd edition: MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Reiter, R. (1980), “A Logic for Default Reasoning”, in Artificial 
intelligence, 13(1-2), 81-132. 
Rosch, E. (1975) “Cognitive Representation of Semantic Categories”, in 
Journal of Experimental Psychology  104: 573–605. 
Wiener, N. (1948/1961), Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the 
Animal and the Machine, MITPress, Cambridge, Mass. (2
nd
 edition: 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961 ). 
 
